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THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION TO SUPPRESS TERRORISM:
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
AS AN EXAMPLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Acts of international terrorism are steadily increasing throughout the
world.' Certain procedural obstacles are currently hindering the
international community's efforts to suppress terrorism.2 The greatest
obstacles include the failure to reach a working definition of terrorism,3 the
failure to gain international cooperation to achieve universally recognized
crimes of terrorism, and the failure to achieve compatibility with divergent
interests between nations.4
This Note will address these issues and propose improvements by first
examining the development of international anti-terrorism laws and terrorist
extradition legislation between the United States ("U.S.") and the Federal
Republic of Germany ("Germany"). Next, this Note will examine
Germany's efforts to combat terrorism through its own domestic laws.
Third, this Note will direct special attention to the extradition treaty between
the U.S. and Germany and the extradition of Mohammed Hamadei. By
examining the Hamadei case, this part of the Note will critique the
application and effectiveness of the U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty.
Finally, this Note will conclude that in achieving a collective policy against
terrorism, the international community should pursue similar policies to
those contained in the U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty. The international
1. See Jirgen Meyer, German Criminal Law Relating To International Terrorism, 60 U.
COLO. L. REv. 571, 571 (1989).
2. See id.
3. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Policy-Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms
and Manifestations of "International Terrorism, "in LEGAL RESPONSES To INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS (1988).
4. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of
Abu Daoud by French Authorities, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 495, 513 (1977).
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community should adopt approaches that parallel domestic German anti-
terrorism laws to alleviate many of the procedural obstacles that hinder
worldwide cooperation in suppressing terrorism. While the U.S.-Germany
Extradition Treaty evidences progress, a more stringent and far-reaching
consensus is needed to put an end to terrorism.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS AND
THEIR LATENT DEFECTS
A. The Lack of an International Definition of Terrorism
International cooperation in defeating terrorism is obtainable only if
uniform agreement can be reached on a definition of criminal terrorism.5
Currently, there is no universally accepted definition of "terrorist act" or
"terrorism., 6 The only international agreement defining terrorism is found
in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.7
The Convention defined acts of terrorism as "criminal acts directed against
a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in minds of
particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public." 8 This
Convention never became legally enforceable due to World War II and the
dissolution of the League of Nations.9  More recently, M. Cherif
Bassiouni 0 attempted to create a universal definition of terrorism as:
an ideologically-motivated strategy of internationally proscribed
violence designed to inspire terror within a particular segment of
a given society in order to achieve a power-outcome or to
propagandize a claim or grievance irrespective of whether its
perpetrators are acting for or on behalf of themselves or on behalf
of a state."
5. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 573.
6. See Miriam Sapiro, Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the
Political Offense Exception, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 654, 655 n.1 (1986).
7. See League of Nations 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1937, art. 1(2), 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23
(1938).
8. Id. art. 1(2).
9. See Sapiro, supra note 6, at 654 n. 1.
10. Professor of Law at DePaul University and Secretary-General of the International
Association of Penal Law
11. Bassiouni, supra note 3, at xxiii.
[Vol. 19266
1999] INT'L COOPERATION TO SUPPRESS TERRORISM
The lack of international consensus on the definition of terrorism has
created difficulties in identifying what terrorist crimes are and how they can
be prevented and controlled. 12 The effect is that one country may categorize
an act as criminal terrorism, while other nations may classify it as a
liberation movement deserving support rather than punishment. 13 Without
a definition for terrorist acts, the international community cannot work
together to adopt universally recognized crimes of terrorism. An
international consensus was lacking until the United Nations addressed this
defect.
B. International Developments to Combat Terrorism
1. United Nations Conventions
The United Nations sponsored several multilateral conventions to define
and develop an international consensus on methods to combat terrorism. 14
These conventions adopted a "piecemeal approach to defining terrorist acts
concerning hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, and the taking of civilian
hostages." 15  The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, also known as the Tokyo Convention of
1963, addresses the concern over aircraft hijacking. 16 The Tokyo
Convention requires its signatories to extend their national jurisdictions to
include the crimes defined therein.17 Therefore, each signatory state must
establish its own jurisdiction over extraterritorial terrorist acts aboard
aircraft with domestic registrations.18 The Tokyo Convention fails to define
the meaning of an international criminal offense, leaving it open to
inconsistencies among the signatory states because the Convention relies
upon domestic law definitions of criminal acts.' 9 Furthermore, the Tokyo
12. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 573.
13. See id. at 571.
14. See id. at 575.
15. Id.
16. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention].
17. See id. art. 3.3.
18. See id. art. 3.1.
19. See Terry R. Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United States Courts:
Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 301 (1987).
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Convention does not require signatory states to either extradite or prosecute
offenders.20
In response to the shortcomings of the Tokyo Convention, the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ("Hague
Convention") established and defined the international crime of hijacking
aboard civil aircraft to ensure consistency among signatory states.21
Furthermore, the Convention adopted the principle of aut dedere aut
judicare.22 This principle allows the participating state to choose either
extradition or prosecution of the offender within its own jurisdiction.23
Under Article 4 of the Hague Convention,
a contracting state is required to extend its extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction over offenses of hijacking if it is: (1) the state where
the aircraft is registered; or (2) the state where the aircraft lands
with the hijacker still aboard; or (3) the state in which the aircraft
lessee's principal place of business is located or its permanent
residence; or (4) the state in which an alleged offender is present,
but from which he is not extradited.24
Furthermore, the Hague Convention provides that any alleged offender
identified within the territory of a signatory state must be seized, and all
potentially interested states must be notified of the apprehension.25
Therefore, in addition to establishing the necessary definitions, the Hague
Convention improved upon the Tokyo Convention by establishing a "near-
universal jurisdiction" over the offense of hijacking rather than merely
establishing jurisdiction by one state over the offender.
26
Another major step toward combating terrorism was the 1971
Convention for the Suppreq.inn nf TTnlwflil Acts Agninct the SAfet of
Civil Aviation (Sabotage) ("Montreal Convention"). 7 This Convention
20. See id.
21. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
22. See D. Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle ofAut
Dedere Aut Judicare, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 483, 483 (1975). Aut dedere autjudicare
translates to "extradite or prosecute." Id.
23. See id.
24. Kane, supra note 19, at 302 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 21, art. 4).
25. See id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 21, art. 6.4).
26. See id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 21, art. 6.1).
27. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
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requires its signatory states to legislate "severe penalties" on a broader
scope of activities that interfere with civil aviation.28 The Montreal
Convention explicitly defines the international criminal acts that endanger
the safety of an aircraft in flight or render it incapable of flight.29 These
criminal acts include:
acts of violence against persons on board an aircraft in flight;
destruction of or damage to, an aircraft in service; sabotage of an
aircraft in service; destruction of, or damage to, air navigation
facilities, or interference with their operation; and communication
of false information that, by its communication, endangers an
aircraft in flight.3°
Furthermore, any attempt to commit these offenses or aid anyone who
commits them also constitutes a punishable offense.3" This important
advance in international cooperation sets forth the principle that a signatory
state must "endeavor to take all practicable measures" to prevent the
enumerated offenses outlined in the Montreal Convention 32 and must make
offenders subject to extradition.33 Therefore, in addition to a state's
obligation to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over an offender, as set
forth under the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention also adds the
right "to establish territorial criminal jurisdiction in the state where the
offense was committed.' 34 Thus far, the United Nations conventions only
addressed threats to civil aviation. Other classes of offenses were in need
of definition and prevention as well.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents ("New York
Convention"), adopted in 1973, takes a different approach from the former
conventions.35 The New York Convention was developed to prevent
Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. no. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1150
[hereinafter Montreal Convention].
28. See Kane, supra note 19, at 303.
29. See Montreal Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.1.
30. Kane, supra note 19, at 303 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.1).
31. See Montreal Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.2.
32. See id. art. 10.1.
33. See Kane, supra note 19, at 303.
34. Kane, supra note 19, at 303 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 27, art. 5).
35. See Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
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violence against "internationally protected persons." 36  Under this
Convention, the protected class of persons are defined as "heads of state,
heads of government, foreign ministers and their families when in foreign
countries, and officials of states or of international organizations and their
families when other international law grants them special protection. ,17 A
signatory state "must protect such persons from murder, kidnapping, and
other attacks upon their person or liberty; violent attacks upon their means
of transport, private accommodations, or official premises likely to
endanger their persons or liberty; and threats and attempts. 3 8 However, by
not criminalizing these offenses under international standards, the issue of
inconsistency arises once again.39 Under the New York Convention, the
offenses are merely "made to be the subject of national prohibitions by the
various contracting states. "40 Thus, the New York Convention established
internationally imposed domestic anti-terrorism laws.
In the aforementioned conventions, the international community did not
universally acknowledge "international criminal offenses" and the need for
specific international anti-terrorism legislation.4' Not until the rapid passage
of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages
Convention") proposed by Germany in 1976, and approved by the United
Nations General Assembly three years later, were international criminal
offenses defined.42 This Convention defined the international offense of
hostage-taking as "[a]ny person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill,
to injure or to continue to detain another person ... in order to compel a
third party. . . to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the hostage. . . . ,,4 Furthermore, "any attempts
to commit or to abet the offense are also crimes."44 This Convention is
similar to the Hague, Montreal, and New York Conventions regarding
No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter New York Convention].
36. Id. art. 1.
37. Id.
38. Kane, supra note 19, at 304 (citing New York Convention, supra note 35, art. 2.1).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See generally Kane, supra note 19.
42. See id. at 306 (citing International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A.
Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/341819 (1979) [hereinafter
Hostages Convention]).
43. Id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 1).
44. Id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 1).
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custody of the offender,45 notification of states,46 and the choice of
extradition,47 or submission for prosecution.48 However, the Hostages
Convention surpasses the previously mentioned conventions by recognizing
the need to acknowledge and define international criminal offenses.
Although the United Nations conventions concerned with single crimes
advance international goals to eradicate and control terrorism, various
problems persist. Because an international organ with the power to
prescribe "international criminal offenses" does not yet exist, jurisdiction
can only be attained through making the specified act a punishable offense
in every member state.4 9 As a result, certain regional level efforts were
aimed at combating the problems of prescribing international criminal
offenses. °
2. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
European states have attempted to resolve one such problem of
prescribing international criminal offenses through the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism ("ECST").i The ECST attempts to
prescribe the internationally conceded exception to extradition: the political
offense exception.52 The ECST provides for extradition of terrorists and
presupposes that certain acts are already punishable under a member state's
national law.53 The ECST is not an extradition treaty itself. Rather, it
modifies existing treaties among the European member states, such as the
European Convention on Extradition ("ECE").54 Although a convention
45. See id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 6.1).
46. See id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 6.2).
47. See id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 10).
48. See id. (citing Hostages Convention, supra note 42, art. 8).
49. See Otto Lagodny, The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. A
Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism? 60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 583, 590 (1989).
50. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 575.
51. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, openedfor signature Jan. 27,
1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter ECST].
52. See id. art. 1. The political offense exception provides for the refusal of extradition
by a requested state for offenses of a political nature or for offenses committed in the context
of a political incident. Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition and the Political Offense
Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 772 (1992).
53. See generally ECST, supra note 51. See also Lagodny, supra note 49, at 590.
54. European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature Dec. 13, 1957, 359
U.N.T.S. 273, Europ. T.S. 24; with two additional protocols to the European Convention
on Extradition, Oct., 1975, Europ. T.S. No. 86; Mar. 17, 1978, Europ. T.S. No. 98
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
like the ECE combats terrorism by extraditing the offender to the member
state that seeks his or her prosecution, it also contains the well known
political offense exception.55 Article 3 of the ECE provides that extradition
shall not be granted if "the offence in respect of which it is requested is
regarded by the requested Party as a political offence or as an offence
connected with a political offence." 56 However, the ECE never defines
"political offense.",57  To prevent this exception from hindering the
suppression of terrorism, the ECST narrows the scope of the political
offense exception to expedite the prosecution of terrorist offenders.58 In this
context, the ECST provides for a "negative definition" of the political
offense by stating what does not constitute a political offense.5 9
In contrast to the Hague Convention, 6° Montreal Convention, 6' and
New York Convention, 62 none of which address the political offense
exception, articles one through four of the ECST provide that certain
offenses shall not "be regarded as a political offense or as an offense
connected with a political offense or as an offense inspired by political
motives. ,63 These non-political offenses are:
(1) offenses within the scope of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague
Convention), and the Convention for the Suppression of the
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal
Convention); (2) serious offenses against internationally protected
persons; (3) taking hostages; and (4) offenses against persons
involving the use of dangerous weapons (e.g. bombs, automatic
firearms).'
The ECST furthered the internatinnal onl of snnressng terrorism by
narrowing the scope of the political offense exception. Nevertheless, it is
[hereinafter ECE]. See also Lagodny, supra note 49, at 583.
55. ECE, supra note 54, art. 3.
56. Id.
57. See generally ECE, supra note 54.
58. See Lagodny, supra note 49, at 583 (citing ECST, supra note 51, arts. 1-4).
59. See ECST, supra note 51, arts. 1-4.
60. Hague Convention, supra note 21, art. 4.
61. Montreal Convention, supra note 27, art. 5.
62. New York Convention, supra note 34, art. 3.
63. ECST, supra note 50, arts. 1-4.
64. Lagodny, supra note 49, at 584-85.
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still necessary to actually define what a "political offense" is and not merely
enumerate what it is not. 65
Second, the ECST approaches the jurisdictional issue with respect to
regional terrorist offenses differently from the single-crime-oriented
conventions of the United Nations.66 Rather than create jurisdiction for a
certain act in many states in order to avoid extradition, the ECST establishes
the "representation principle. ,67 This principle allows a requested state to
extend in personam jurisdiction to a fugitive terrorist who is within its
territory simply because that terrorist is not within the requesting state's
territory. 68 Thus, the requested state becomes the "representative" of the
requesting state in the fugitive's prosecution. 69 This cures the requesting
state's jurisdictional deficiency over an absent offender. This concept of
jurisdiction is much broader in scope than jurisdiction based on
territoriality. 70 Thus the ECST, although it does not expand the number of
crimes which are punishable by its member states, advances the quest for
universal anti-terrorist legislation and focuses on the need for international
member-state cooperation.
IH. ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN GERMANY
Over the past twenty years, the German Federal Legislature has
continuously enacted laws to combat terrorism. 71 The overall policy is to
suppress terrorism at its source through stringent domestic laws. 72 This
guiding policy was reflected in major reforms that led to the enactment of
six anti-terrorism laws. 73 The legislation was contemporaneous with the
aforementioned international conventions and yet was more specific in
nature. This Note will address these German laws individually.
The first enactment was the 1974 Gesetz zur Ergidnzung des Ersten
Gesetzes zur Reform des Stafverfahrensrechts (Law Supplementary to the
First Law on the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Statute).74 This law
65. See id. at 591.
66. See id. at 590.




71. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 576.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. (citing StPO §§ 137.1, 138a, 146, 231a (1975)).
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limits the number of defense attorneys allowed to represent a terrorist
suspect to three. 7 Furthermore, the law rules out the chance of an attorney
defending more than one client in the same action by proscribing the
practice of joint representation 76 and "regularize[s] the procedure of
completely excluding defense attorneys where there is reason to believe that
the attorney and his client are collaborating with criminal intent. "77 This
new law also allows for trial of a "defendant in absentia if, on account of
his disturbances during the proceedings, his presence would make it
impossible to hold the trial, or if he is unable to attend the trial on account
of a self-induced injury."78 Although this law was an effort to restrict
terrorists' actions once in custody, additional reforms were needed to
combat their actions prior to custody.
Consequently, the second step taken was the 1976 enactment of the
Antiterrorismus-Gesetz (Anti-terrorism Law) .79 This law introduced a new
provision in the Federal Criminal Code, which punishes organized terrorist
groups with up to ten years imprisonment.80 Furthermore, this law relaxed
due process requirements by making it easier to commit a defendant for
trial. 81 For example, an alleged offender can be detained on pending appeal
or rehearing simply because of suspicion even if no risk of attempt to escape
or danger of collusion is likely. 82 Due process was also relaxed by allowing
for the monitoring of all correspondence between defendant and his counsel
under surveillance, if an alleged offender is being detained on suspicion of
having committed an offense pursuant to this provision. 3 Together, these
reforms evidenced Germany's stringent domestic policy against suppressing
terrorism.
A series of minor reforms followed specific instances of terrorist acts.'4
One example is the third reform taken by Germany in 1977, known as the
1 It OL,4W erru Gaiuiiii U0 IL.UI UU1 .L. UlI_1 IvIUflhl,
75. See id. (citing StPO § 137.1(2)).
76. See id. (citing StPO § 146).
77. Id. (citing StPO § 138a).
78. Id. (citing StPO § 231a).
79. Id. (citing StGB § 129a (1976); StPO §§ 1, 148.2 (1976)).
80. See id. at 576-77 (citing StGB § 129a).
81. See id.
82. See id. (citing StPO § 112 (1976)).
83. See id. (citing StPO § 148.2).
84. See id.
85. Id. (citing EGGVG §§ 31-48 (1977), § 34a (1985) (German judicial code)).
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which banned all contacts with other terrorist Red Army Faction ("RAF") 86
members once a fellow RAF member was captured, was in direct response
to the kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer. 87 This was the legal basis for
curtailing contact with other RAF members, because it was believed that the
captured RAF members would further direct the kidnapping. 88 Another
minor reform was the enactment of the 1978 Gesetz zur Anderung der
Strafprozessordnung (Law on the Reform of the Code of Criminal
Procedure) .89 This law set up road checkpoints and required identification
of individuals passing through them.' In addition, it provided that
communication between a terrorist suspect and defense counsel be
conducted through a glass reception cell to prevent them from exchanging
objects.91 Furthermore, the 1986 enactment of the Gesetz zur Anderung der
Strafprozessordnung (Amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure)
92
allowed for "the storage on short-term data files up to a maximum of three
months of all personal data collected in the course of a search, regardless of
whether the alleged offender had a prior police record. ,93 The final reform
was the 1986 Gesetz zur Bekidmpfung des Terrorismus (Law on the
Suppression of Terrorism).94 This reform revived the earlier repealed crime
of "incitement to an act of terrorism. "95 In addition, it strengthened and
"tightened the previously mentioned anti-terrorism provisions. "96 When
evaluated in sum, these reforms reflect Germany's successful efforts to
pinpoint the necessity for specific anti-terrorism legislation as opposed to the
"piecemeal approach" taken by the United Nations' international
conventions.
Other principles merit discussion at this point because they also
demonstrate Germany's commitment to the suppression of terrorism. In
86. The Red Army Faction is a German terrorist organization which has contact bases not
only in Germany, but in neighboring states as well, such as Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. See generally Meyer, supra note 1.
87. See id. at 577. Schleyer, the Arbeitgeberprasident (President of the Federal
Association of Employers), was assassinated in October 1977. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. (citing StPO §§ 111, 148.2 (1978)).
90. See id. (citing StPO § 111).
91. See id. (citing StPO § 148.2(3)).
92. Id. at 578 (citing StPO § 163(d) (1986)).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing StGB §§ 129a, 130a (1986)).
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing StGB § 129a (stating that the maximum sentence for group leaders of
terrorist organizations was increased from ten to fifteen years)).
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1986, Germany incorporated the "principle of universality" into its Criminal
Code. 97 Under this principle, which is similar to the "representation
principle" within the ECST, a terrorist act is punishable in Germany even
if the act was committed beyond its borders, regardless of the law of the
place of commission.98 Thus, extraterritorial terrorist acts can be punished
in Germany despite the absence of anti-terrorist enforcement elsewhere. 99
In addition, all criminal offenses punishable pursuant to international treaties
binding on Germany are subject to the principle of universality. 1oo Thus, a
case of international terrorism prosecuted in Germany under the principle
of universality deserves comment at this point.
IV. THE CASE OF MOHAMMED ALl HAMADEI AND THE
UNITED STATES-GERMANY EXTRADITION TREATY
A. The Extradition of Mohammed Ali Hamadei
1. Facts
In 1985, terrorists boarded a TWA flight from Athens to Rome and
hijacked the plane to Beirut. 101 Once in Lebanon, the terrorists executed
U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and held thirty-nine of the mostly
American passengers and crew hostage for seventeen days. " Based on this
act, the alleged terrorists were indicted for the hijacking in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in November 1985.103 On January 13,
1987, one of the accused hijackers, Mohammed Ali Hamadei, a twenty-two
year old Lebanese, flew into Frankfurt, Germany on a false passport with
a suitcase full of liquid explosives,' 1o The West German police captured and
arresteu Hamnadei. - Aierican officials immediately sought his
97. See id. at 580 (citing StGB § 6 (including that this law explicitly applies to offenses
such as hijacking of an aircraft)).
98. See id. (citing StGB § 6).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See David M. Kennedy et al., The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARv.
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extradition.' °6 However, within days of Hamadei's arrest and before
Germany could even act on the U.S. request, two Germans were kidnapped
in Beirut.'°7 This complicated the extradition because if Hamadei were
extradited to the U.S., the two German hostages would be executed.108
Thus, the issue for Germany became whether the lives of the hostages could
be preserved without capitulating to the demands of the hostage takers. 109
The U.S. wanted Germany to extradite Hamadei." 0 The Germans, on the
other hand, believed they had a legal right to refuse extradition based upon
the principle of aut dedere autjudicare (extradite or prosecute) within the
U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty ("Extradition Treaty")."' Germany had
a right to refuse extradition based on the German charges for the passport
and the explosive materials for which Hamadei was arrested in Frankfurt. 112
Furthermore, Germany asserted its right to prosecute Hamadei based on the
universality principle, which allowed Germany to claim jurisdiction over
certain serious crimes, including hijacking, regardless of who committed the
crimes or where they occurred.1 3 Therefore, because of the universality
principle of jurisdiction, Germany could also try Hamadei for the TWA
offenses. 4 Ultimately, Germany refused to extradite Hamadei to the U.S.
and prosecuted Hamadei for the hijacking in the German courts. 15
2. The U.S. -Germany Extradition Treaty with Respect to the Hamadei Case
The Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and Germany was in force 116
at the time of the Hamadei case and played an important role in Germany's
decision not to extradite Hamadei to the U.S. and to prosecute him in
106. See id.
107. See id. at 6.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 10.
110. See id.
111. See id. See also Treaty Concerning Extradition Between the United States and West
Germany, June 20, 1978, U.S.-West Germany, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785
[hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
112. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 10.
113. See id. (citing StGB § 6 (1986)).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 11.
116. The Extradition Treaty has been in force since 1978. See generally Extradition
Treaty, supra note 111.
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Germany. 11 7 Under the Extradition Treaty, the decision to extradite or try
the terrorist is left to the unfettered discretion of the requested states."'
Germany's decision to prosecute rather than to extradite Hamadei was
influenced mainly by the kidnapping of two German nationals in Lebanon
immediately after Hamadei's arrest." 9 Although Germany chose not to take
affirmative steps to extradite Hamadei to the U.S., it acted in full
compliance with the treaty when it invoked the treaty's provision of the
principle of aut dedere autjudicare. 12
0
Had Germany agreed to extradite Hamadei to the U.S., additional
problems would have arisen, mainly with respect to the political offense
exception to extradition. ' 2 Because the Extradition Treaty fails to define the
term "political offense," the requested state has the discretion to apply its
own definition of political offense. 122 Therefore, since the Extradition
Treaty does not define political offense, the decision is left to German
law. 123 Hamadei clearly would have raised the treaty's political offense
exception, claiming that his acts were part of a "war of liberation" against
Israel and its ally, the U.S. 24 Consequently, the decision to prosecute
Hamadei within Germany avoided the potential difficulty with the political
offense exception had Hamadei been extradited to the U.S. 125
On the contrary, under German law, the difficulty of defining a
political offense would never have been an issue and Hamadei could never
have raised the exception as a defense. 126 Under Germany's Constitution or
117. See generally Kennedy, supra note 101.
118. See id. at 21. See also Meyer, supra note 1, at 580.
119. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 21.
120. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 111, art. 10(1) (stating that extradition may be
refused if the requested state seeks proceedings against the person for whom extradition is
sought).
121. See id. art. 4(1) (stating that extradition shall not be granted if the offense is
regarded by the requested state as a political offense or an offense of a political character).
122. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 22 (citing Extradition Treaty, supra note 111, art.
4(3)). This article only specifies that certain offenses shall not be considered political,
namely: "[a] murder or other willful crime against the life or physical integrity of a Head
of State or Head of Government of one of the Contracting Parties or of a member of his
family... [including an] offense which the Contracting Parties or the Requesting State have
the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multi-lateral international agreement." Extradition
Treaty, supra note 111, art. 4(3)(a)-(b).
123. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 22.
124. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 581.
125. See generally Kennedy, supra note 101.
126. See id.
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Grundgesetz of 1949 (Basic Law), certain circumstances involving
extradition would be contrary to the Constitution. 1 27 Extradition of an
offender would be contrary to German basic rights set forth in Germany's
Constitution if:
(1) the death penalty would be carried out; (2) the person was
condemned in absentia; (3) the person would be tortured; (4) the
prison conditions in the requesting state would cause severe
damage to health or to life; or (5) the penal provisions on which
the requesting states grounds its charges are contrary to the rights
provided by the Basic Law. 128
Therefore, a defendant's or, in this case, offender's interests and rights are
met under the German Constitution and the necessity to have a political
offense exception becomes redundant. Had such a provision been available
within the Extradition Treaty, Germany would have been able to extradite
Hamadei to the U.S. without the controversy of the political offense
exception defense to acquit Hamadei of any wrongdoing.
3. The Supplemental Treaty to the U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty
The Supplemental Treaty between the U.S. and Germany provides yet
another solution to improve extradition laws with respect to terrorism. 1
29
However, this Treaty was not yet entered into force at the time of the
Hamadei case.1 30 Due to the improvements made to extradition law by the
enactment of the Supplemental Treaty, former problems arising out of the
Extradition Treaty cease to exist, such as the problematic political offense
exception. 131
One advantage to the new Supplemental Treaty is the manner in which
extraditable offenses are defined. 132 Rather than define extraditable offenses
in a lengthy appendix,1 33 as does the Extradition Treaty, the Supplemental
127. See Lagodny, supra note 49, at 595.
128. Id.
129. See Supplemental Treaty of October 21, 1986, United States-West Germany, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 6 I00th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987), 1988 BGBI 11 1086 [hereinafter
Supplemental Treaty].
130. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 16.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 111, Appendix. The Appendix lists such
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Treaty broadens its definitions of the offenses. 134 The Supplemental Treaty
has amended the Extradition Treaty as follows:
Extraditable offenses under the Treaty are offenses which are
punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties. In
determining what is an extraditable offense it shall not matter
whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties place the
offense within the same category of offense or denominate an
offense by the same terminology, or whether dual criminality
follows from Federal, State or Linder laws. In particular, dual
criminality may include offenses based upon participation in an
association whose aims and activities include the commission of
extraditable offenses, such as a criminal society under the laws of
the Federal Republic of Germany or an association involved in
racketeering or criminal enterprise under the laws of the United
States. 135
Another major improvement to the Extradition Treaty provided by the
Supplemental Treaty is the emergence of the depoliticization of certain
offenses. 136 In other words, the Supplemental Treaty addresses the problem
of defiming "political offense" by reformulating the exceptions.137  By
preserving the principle of protected political activity but narrowing
grounds for which extradition may be denied, the Supplemental Treaty
closes the gap through which many terrorists have escaped prosecution. '
38
extraditable offenses as murder, assault, rape, libel, and fraud. See id.
134. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 16. See also Supplemental Treaty, supra note 129,
art. 1.
135. Supplemental Treaty, supra note 129, art. 2.
136. See Petersen, supra note 52, at 781.
137. See id.
138. See id. The Supplemental Treaty amended those offenses that were not extraditable.
See Supplemental Treaty, supra note 129, art. 2. For the purposes of the Treaty the
following offenses shall not be deemed to be offenses within the meaning of paragraph (1):
a. an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation to
extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their competent
authorities for decision as to prosecution;
b. murder, manslaughter, maliciously wounding, or inflicting grievous
bodily harm;
c. kidnapping, abduction, or any form of unlawful detention, including
taking a hostage;
d. placing or using explosive, incendiary or destructive device capable
of endangering life, or causing grievous bodily harm, or of causing
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Thus, this improvement by the Supplemental Treaty represents a major step
forward in enforcement cooperation and joint efforts to suppress terrorism
between the U.S. and Germany.
Nonetheless, the current Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and
Germany still contains problems unsolved by the Supplemental Treaty. 1
39
First, the Supplemental Treaty leaves open the question "of what documents
are required to make the prima facie case necessary to support an extradition
request. "140
Second, if only for academic interest since it has not posed a problem,
is that while the U.S. extradites its nationals, Germany is forbidden to do
so under its Constitution. 141 The U.S. law allows "any person within [its]
jurisdiction to be extradited from the United States." 142  The German
Constitution, on the other hand, states "[n]o German may be extradited to
a foreign country." 143 Most countries do deny extradition of their own
nationals to another state, either by constitution or by statute.'44 Thus, the
principle of "reciprocity" of extradition is prohibited from coming into play
because common law countries would be prevented from extraditing their
own nationals to civil law countries because the civil law countries are
unable to extradite their own nationals.1 45 The U.S. and Germany have
successfully established a de facto reciprocity which means German
prosecutors are required under the "legality principle"'46 to commit to trial
any German national who has committed an offense abroad which, as stated
substantial property damage;
e. an attempt or conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the
foregoing offenses.
Id.
139. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 17.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 18.
142. Id. at 18 n.71 (citing 18 U.S.C § 3184 (1982)).
143. Id. (citing GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16, para. 2 (F.R.G.)).
144. See id. at 18.
145. See id. "Reciprocity" is the assurance that the requesting state will itself extradite
in an equivalent future case. The requirement comes from the sovereignty of the requested
state, not from the rights of the individual. Id. at 18 n.73 (citing Lagodny, Die
Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BErrRAGE UND
MATERIALEN AUS DEM MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR AusLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT 48, 351 (1987)).
146. Kennedy, supra note 101, at 19 (citing StPO § 2(2) (obliging police, prosecutors,
and judges to prosecute so long as a reasonable suspicion exists)).
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earlier, is automatically subject to German criminal jurisdiction. 14 7 In
return, the U.S. can maintain its position of extraditing its own nationals.148
Therefore, any potential conflicts are mitigated through the establishment
of this de facto reciprocity.
A third problem between the U.S. and Germany with respect to
extraditing terrorists concerns the death penalty. 4 9 Under the German
Constitution, the death penalty has been abolished.1 50 However, the
Extradition Treaty has accommodated for this difference between the two
countries by providing as follows:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable
by death under the laws of the Requesting State and the laws of the
Requested State do not permit such punishment for that offense,
extradition may be refused unless the Requesting State furnishes
such assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the
death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be
executed. 151
Thus, the Extradition Treaty takes into account the basic rights inherent in
the German Constitution and imposes no provision which would be contrary
to the domestic law of Germany. 152 In conclusion, although the Extradition
Treaty still contains a few minor problems, its overall impact toward
achieving a worldwide policy against terrorism has proven to be quite
effective.
V. PROPOSALS
A closer adherence to the laws of Germany combating terrorism would
benefit the international community. For example, an approach similar to
the domestic laws of Germany would eliminate the need for the
controversial political offense exception within extradition treaties. Under
German constitutional law, any provision contrary to its basic rights would




150. See id. (citing GRUNDGESETZ [Constitutionl JGGI art. 102 (F.R.G.)).
151. Extradition Treaty, supra note 111, art. 12.
152. See Kennedy, supra note 101, at 19-20.
153. See id.
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own Constitution, there is no need for the controversial and problematic
political offense exception to allow terrorists to escape punishment because
their act of violence was achieved based on political reasons. Stricter
conformity to German laws regarding defenses and laws against terrorism
would allow the international community to abolish the political offense
exception.
Another proposal towards the achievement of a universal policy against
terrorism would be to establish a permanent International Criminal Court
and to create universally recognized acts of international criminal law.
Professor Bassiouni has defined twenty-two categories of international
criminal law. 154 In the summer 1998, 120 of the 148 participating states
supported a statute for the creation of permanent International Criminal
Court that would act as a tribunal to hear cases where such universally
recognized acts were committed. 155  For example, this International
Criminal Court would act as an incremental or additional tool for the
effective prosecution of those cases when states elect the International
Criminal Court to adjudicate the matters. 
156
The international community needs to move forward and redevelop its
provisions and standards toward dealing with the suppression of terrorism.
The aforementioned German laws, as well as the mutual assistance
demonstrated by the Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and Germany,
should help to provide workable new standards in promoting cooperation of
an international policy to combat terrorist acts and provide mutual assistance
in criminal matters. These laws help to establish stringent anti-terrorism
policy and alleviate many of the procedural obstacles hindering international
cooperation in suppressing terrorism.
154. These twenty-two crimes are: aggression, war crimes, unlawful use of weapons,
crimes against humanity, genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, slavery, torture,
unlawful human experimentation, piracy, aircraft hijacking, threat and use of force against
internationally protected persons, taking of civilian hostages, drug offenses, international
traffic of obscene publications, destruction and/or theft of national treasures, environmental
protection, theft of nuclear materials, unlawful use of mails, interference with submarine
cables, counterfeiting, bribery of foreign public officials. See M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New
International World Order, 25 VAND. J. ITRANSNAT'L L. 151, 163 (1992).
155. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
156. See Bassiouni, supra note 154, at 164.
283
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without international cooperation, the problem of terrorism will never
be solved. 157 As demonstrated, a universally recognized definition of
terrorism is necessary for its suppression. 15 8 Without a concrete definition,
the international community cannot begin to reach a consensus on how to
combat terrorism. 159 What one country categorizes as a violent act of
terrorism may be considered a freedom movement by another state less
willing to accept the concept of terrorism. 160 However, Germany's domestic
anti-terrorism laws demonstrate a sound effort to combat terrorism at its
source because they pinpoint the necessity for specific and stringent anti-
terrorism legislation. Moreover, the relationship between the U.S. and
Germany with respect to the Extradition Treaty should be used as an
example of mutual cooperation to suppress violent acts of terrorists and
punish the offenders. Through the extradition case of Mohammed
Hamadei, the practical effects of this Treaty demonstrated the best outcome
for both countries in attaining the mutual goal of punishing the offender.
Although some problems may still exist, the Supplemental Treaty is an
effort to further improve upon the work accomplished by the U.S. and
Germany. The international community should take note of the joint effort
taken by these two countries in suppressing terrorism and contribute to an
international scheme for the prosecution of all acts .of terrorism.
Sabrina R. Der Bagdasarian
157. See id.
158. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 573.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 571.
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